

YELLOWHAMMER FUND, on  
behalf of itself and its clients.

(A#E NO. )\*)+,cv,-.-./-,MH

Plaintiff,

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v.

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WE# ALA "AMA WOMEN1#  
(EN ER, on behalf of the2 selves  
and thei3 staff4 et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

# E\$E MAR#HALL, in his official  
ca%acit& as Alaba 2 a Atto3ne&  
!ene3al,

Defendant.

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Cases

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 5. + #. (t. )@= A)-)+' ..... )5, ))

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 5.5 #. (t. )+<+ A)-)5' ..... +- , ++

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June - ed. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 2015 (Tenn.) ..... 5

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Johnson v. Mesmer, 2015 U.S. 505 ..... 5





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Other Authorities

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access la ; f7l abo3tion ca3e in othe3 states, and Defendant1s asse3tion that he can  
c3i 2 inal9e %eo%le ; ho s7%%o3t s7ch ca3e offends the val7es of sove3ei8nt& and co 2 it&  
that a3e fo7ndational to o73 constit7tional st37ct73e.



Members of Plaintiff's staff learned about Defendant's statements after his appearance on the Jeff Poo's show; . Fountain Decl. K 4 McLain Decl. K 4. Yello ; ha 2 2 e3 F7nd believed that Defendant's threats specifically targeted the 2. ee McLain Decl. K 4 Fountain Decl. KK ?, 4). On the months since his radio appearance, Defendant has reaffirmed his belief that he can target abortion helpees ; hen the assist ; ith la ; f7l, o7t, of, state abortion care. ee Fountain Decl. KK 4). McLain Decl. KK 4).

Yello ; ha 2 2 e3 F7nd is a reproductive justice organization founded in 1995. Fountain Decl. KK 4 McLain Decl. K 5. Reproductive justice organizations are typically "local, led organizations that believe all people have the right to decide ; hen the3 to have children, ; hen to have children, and ho ; to parent the children the have in safe and health& environments. Fountain Decl. K 4 McLain Decl. K 5.





Fountain Decl. KK )=L+- . Plaintiff also ; old 3es7 2 e %3ovidin8 info3 2 ation to calle3s

especiall& dan8e3o7s fo3 ce3tain %o%7lations. P3e8nanc&,3elated deaths dis%a3atel&  
i2%act co2 27nities of colo3. Id. at K +/. Acco3din8 to a )- )5 3e%o3t, the 2ate3nal  
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)- )5 ; as )??.? deaths %e3 5--,--- live bi3ths, ; hile the 2ate3nal 2 o3talit& 3ate fo3  
" lacB ; o2 en ; as ?@.@ deaths %e3 5--,--- live bi3ths. Id. at K +?.



fact that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is premature and the fact is material to the outcome of the case. Anderson, 2011 WL 1000000 at \*10.

Rule 56(e) provides that a party may not move for summary judgment at an early stage. See *2011 WL 1000000*, Inc. v. *Farrand Optical Co.*, 2011 WL 1000000, 2011 WL 1000000 (3d Cir. 5/10/11). A court may consider a motion for summary judgment to allow the non-moving party to obtain affidavits or declarations to be discovered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(2)(B), but only if the non-moving party identifies specific facts and cites to the relevant portions of the record; in the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See *2011 WL 1000000*, at \*10 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pertinent facts are obvious and undisputed, the record, and the only reasonable inferences are legal questions that a court is competent to address.

is a credible threat of prosecution. (Acobs v. The Florida Bar, 15 F.3d 105, 115. 115th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment because there are no factual disputes that preclude resolution of its claims. As a matter of law, Alabama's Arbitration Act reaches only as far as its borders, and the Due Process Clause strictly forbids Defendant to sue in Alabama outside of the state's borders.





Indians

Id. 67st as 0ndiana co7ld not %7nish la ; f7l cond7ct occ733in8 in 0llinois, Alaba2a cannot %7nish abo3tion occ733in8 in states ; he3e it is le8al.

0t then necessa3il& follo ; s that a violation of Alaba2als cons%i3ac& o3 accesso3& liabilit& la ; s in connection ; ith the Abo3tion "an can %e3tain onl& to abo3tions %e3fo32ed in Alaba2a. (ons%i3ac& 3eN7i3es intent to violate an Alaba2a c3i2inal offense. Ala. (ode > 5+A,.,+Aa'. Accesso3& liabilit& involves holdin8 a %e3son acco7ntable fo3 an Alaba2a c3i2inal offense, if that %e3son assists in the co22ission of that offense. Ala. (ode > 5+A,.,)+. As a 3es7lt, Ala. (ode >> 5+A,.,+ and 5+A,.,)+ do not a%%l& to Plaintiff1s desi3ed activities beca7se Plaintiff seeBs to assist Alaba2ians in obtainin8 la ; f7l, o7t,of,state abo3tion ca3e, ; hich Alaba2als Abo3tion "an does not 3each. ee supra at 55.

Defendant has th3eatened to %3osec7te s7ch cond7ct as cons%i3ac& 7sin8 Alaba2a (ode > 5+A,.,... hat stat7te %3ovides that F0aP cons%i3ac& fo32ed in this state to do an act be&ond the state, ; hich, if done in this state, ; o7ld be a c3i2inal offense, is indictable and %7nishable in this state in all 3es%ects as if s7ch cons%i3ac& had been to do s7ch act in this state.G Id. Alaba2a (ode > 5+A,.,. ; as onl& intended to codif& 6hompson v. tate, 5< #o. /5) AAla. 5=@ / ', and this (o73t sho7ld inte3%3et it in line ; ith that case.

In *Thompson*, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a prosecutor could indict on a conspiracy to murder; furthermore, to be one thousand dollars . . . from the victim's person, and against his life, limb, and violence. *Id.* at 15+. The victim of the robbery lived in Florida at the time of the offense. *Id.* There is no question in *Thompson* that the act of robbery could have been a crime in the state; hence it is as planned to occur. *Id.* In fact, the indictment established the illegality of the act; hence it occurred. *Id.* at 15+, 15?. While the court in *Thompson* agreed there is no statute that establishes criminal liability to conduct in Florida; Florida acts in other states, the court explained that the clarity of Florida's law of the act in both states is sufficient to establish the indictment. *Id.* at 15/15?.

Alabama Code § 5-A-1-1 has been codified in the decision in *Thompson* and should not be interpreted to amend these circumstances. Hence, the threats of prosecution relate to activities that could be legal in the state; hence they occur. Alabama Code § 5-A-1-1 can only conceivably reach conspiracies to engage in conduct that is illegal; hence it occurs. Upon information and belief, Alabama Code § 5-A-1-1 has never been used to prosecute an extrajudicial conspiracy, and it certainly has not been used to prosecute someone who formed an alleged conspiracy to engage in legal conduct. Hence it is impossible for Plaintiff to allege to state of state abortions, its desired activities are not prohibited by Alabama Code § 5-A-1-1.

his ; as also t37e in Cruthers, ; hich eval7ated a stat7te liBe Alaba2 a ( ode >

5+A, ., . . hat 0ndiana stat7te stated\*

Aidin8 Felon& in Anothe3 #tate. Eve3& %e3son ; ho shall,  
; hile in this state, aid in and abet the perpetration or  
attempt to perpetrate an offense in another state #hich by  
the la#s of this state is a felony, shall be dee2 ed 87ilt& of  
a felon&, and 7%on conviction the3eof shall be %7nished in  
the sa2e 2anne3 and to the sa2e e:tent as accesso3ies  
befo3e the fact to the co2 2ission of s7ch a felon& a3e  
%3osec7ted and %7nished b& the c3i2 inal la ; s of the state4  
and it shall not be essential to the conviction of s7ch  
%e3son of said felon& that the %3inci%al be %3osec7ted fo3









because the safety and health of its citizens may be affected; when they travel to that State. *Biello v. Virginia*, 5 U.S. 543 (1980). A state cannot ban the dissemination of information about an activity that is legal in another state, even under the guise of exercising internal police powers. *Id.* at 543. The same is true here. Plaintiff is seeking to sue about actions taken in another state, which are obviously activities that Alabama police officers do not reach. *Id.* at 543.

"Because a conviction of conspiracy under Alabama (Code §§ 5-6-1, 5-6-2, 5-6-3, 5-6-4, 5-6-5, 5-6-6, 5-6-7, 5-6-8, 5-6-9, 5-6-10, 5-6-11, 5-6-12, 5-6-13, 5-6-14, 5-6-15, 5-6-16, 5-6-17, 5-6-18, 5-6-19, 5-6-20, 5-6-21, 5-6-22, 5-6-23, 5-6-24, 5-6-25, 5-6-26, 5-6-27, 5-6-28, 5-6-29, 5-6-30, 5-6-31, 5-6-32, 5-6-33, 5-6-34, 5-6-35, 5-6-36, 5-6-37, 5-6-38, 5-6-39, 5-6-40, 5-6-41, 5-6-42, 5-6-43, 5-6-44, 5-6-45, 5-6-46, 5-6-47, 5-6-48, 5-6-49, 5-6-50, 5-6-51, 5-6-52, 5-6-53, 5-6-54, 5-6-55, 5-6-56, 5-6-57, 5-6-58, 5-6-59, 5-6-60, 5-6-61, 5-6-62, 5-6-63, 5-6-64, 5-6-65, 5-6-66, 5-6-67, 5-6-68, 5-6-69, 5-6-70, 5-6-71, 5-6-72, 5-6-73, 5-6-74, 5-6-75, 5-6-76, 5-6-77, 5-6-78, 5-6-79, 5-6-80, 5-6-81, 5-6-82, 5-6-83, 5-6-84, 5-6-85, 5-6-86, 5-6-87, 5-6-88, 5-6-89, 5-6-90, 5-6-91, 5-6-92, 5-6-93, 5-6-94, 5-6-95, 5-6-96, 5-6-97, 5-6-98, 5-6-99, 5-6-100) is a criminal offense, if the underlying criminal offense is unconstitutional, it follows that a conviction of conspiracy to commit and abetting an unconstitutional offense would also be unconstitutional. On 5/2, if the statutes are interpreted to cover Plaintiff's activities, the constitutional application of Alabama laws would violate the Due Process Clause and Principles of state sovereignty and comity.

As explained above, Plaintiff's suit, of course, does not violate Alabama law. See supra at 5-15. Even if this court disagrees, Defendant does not prosecute Plaintiff because doing so would violate the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff and other Alabama citizens. For all else, the First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its content, its ideas, its

Subject matter, of its content. *Police Dept of Chic. v. Mosley*, 408 U.S. 92, 72 S.Ct. 1757, 34 L.Ed.2d 653 (1972).  
On the face, Defendant's threats of harassment and association because of the messages conveyed and the expressive activities thereof. As explained below, Plaintiff is entitled to sue Defendant on its First Amendment claims because Defendant's threats of harassment, intimidation, and association on the basis of their content and viewpoint, and Defendant's asserted interests cannot satisfy strict scrutiny.

The First Amendment forbids the government to dictate what we see or read or speak or hear. *Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.*, 535 U.S. 564, 122 S.Ct. 1888, 152 L.Ed.2d 531 (2002). It protects the right of all people to make their own decisions about the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.

A5@=@'. On addition to speech, the First Amendment also protects conduct that is  
efficiently expressive. See *Fort Lauderdale Food "ot Bombs v. City of Fort  
Lauderdale*, 2015 F.3d 515, 519. 55th (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc).

As a matter of law, Defendant's threats are infringing on Plaintiff's right to  
engage in the speech related to law, of, of, state abortion case. There can be no  
doubt that Plaintiff's abortion fund wishes to provide information to  
pregnant Alabamians about law, of, of, state abortion case, including referrals,  
guidance, and social support. See e.g., *Fortain Decl.* 5/4 *McLain Decl.* 11, 12.

This type of communication clearly constitutes the speech that indisputably  
qualifies for First Amendment protection. See *303 Creative LLC*, 591 U.S. 413 (2020).  
All manner of speech, including pickets, protests, demonstrations, and parades,  
to social justice and the intended, ordinary, and for the First Amendment is  
protected. *Am. Nat. Hist. & Plan. v. California*, 564 U.S. 505 (2011).

Defendant's threat to prevent Plaintiff from engaging in expressive conduct. The  
threat (which has announced a threat to detain; the conduct is  
protected by the First Amendment. 55th (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc). The speech has  
an artistic, literary, and political nature; in the various circumstances of the case.

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 Iolloman e5 rel. Iolloman v. Iarland, +<- F.+d 5)/), 5)<- A55th (i3. )--.'  
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 5/-5, 5/- / A55th (i3. 5@@-' Aa school e 2 %lo&eels FN7iet and non,dis37%tiveG ea3l&  
 de%a3t73e f3o 2 a 2 andato3& 2 eetin8 ; as e:%3essive'.

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 necessa3il& en8a8ed in e:%3essive cond7ct. ee+ e.\*., FLF "B, @-5 F.+d at 5) . -L.5  
 Ae:%lainin8 that %3ovidin8 access to a necessa3& h7 2 an 3i8ht is a fo3 2 of e:%3essive  
 cond7ct'. Plaintiff intends to conve& a 2 essa8e of solida3it&, love, and s7%%o3t ; hen  
 it hel%s %3e8nant Alaba2ians access la ; f7l o7t,of,state abo3tion ca3e. ee+ e.\*.,  
 Fo7ntain Decl. KK 5-L5+, 5=L) -4 McLain Decl. KK 55L5., )@L+-, +). Plaintiff is a  
 2 ission,d3iven o38ani9ation that envisions a ; o3ld ; he3e all %eo%le can access  
 3e%3od7ctive healthca3e, 3e8a3dless of thei3 inco 2 e level o3 %lace of 3esidence. ee  
 Fo7ntain Decl. K ?. he3e can be no dis%7te that Plaintiff1s abo3tion f7nd seeBs to  
 advance the o38ani9ation1s 2 ission and 2 essa8e b& hel%in8 co 2 2 7nit& 2 e 2 be3s  
 affo3d abo3tion ca3e and 3ed7cin8 ba33ie3s that li 2 it access to ca3e. ee Fo7ntain Decl.  
 K 55L5). F73the3, as a %3evio7s f7nde3 of abo3tion, Plaintiff seeBs to cont3ib7te  
 financiall& to %3e8nant Alaba2ians1 o7t,of,state abo3tions and %3ovide lo8istical  
 s7%%o3t fo3 t3avel, childca3e, lod8in8, and othe3 3elated needs. ee McLain Decl. KK  
 +)L++. (o73ts have 3e%eatedl& 3eco8ni9ed that donatin8 2 one& to a %olitical,  
 cha3itable, o3 social ca7se N7alifies as e:%3essive cond7ct. ee+ e.\*., - cCutcheon v.

Fed. Election Comm)n





at 5) <- Ae: %lainin8 that cond7ct is e: %3essive if an obEective, 3easonable obse3ve3 ; o7ld inte3%3et it as Fsome so3t of 2 essa8eG'.

Fo3 these 3easons, Plaintiff1s activities a3e e: %3essive, 3e%3esentin8 %73e s%eech and e: %3essive cond7ct, and a3e the3efo3e %3otected b& the Fi3st A 2 end 2 ent.

" & th3eatenin8 to %3osec7te Plaintiff fo3 s7%%o3tin8 la ; f7l abo3tion ca3e, Defendant ta38ets Plaintiff1s s%eech on the basis of its content and vie ; %oint. ( ontent, based la ; s Fta38et s%eech based on its co 2 2 7nicative content,G ; hile vie ; %oint, based la ; s %3ohibit s%eech based on the F%a3tic7la3 vie ; s taBen b& s%eaBe3s on a s7bEect.G  
peech First+ Inc. 3smEeFm3o

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Here, there can be no dispute that Defendant's threats prohibit speech based on the message it communicates and the goals it advances. Defendant's threats specifically target abortion helpees that Fought the battles as friends of our, of, state abortions and use funds to facilitate our, of, state abortions. See #7191e Decl. K.

To determine if a speaker violated these restrictions, Defendant should have to examine the content of Plaintiff's message to pregnant Alabamians, abortion providers, volunteers, and members of the public to decide whether it is as a matter of public interest and facilitating our, of, state abortions. See *Id.*, 2023 U.S. at 57. According to Plaintiff, a restriction is content-based if its enforcement depends fundamentally on the communicative content of the speech. See also *Otto v. City of Boca Raton*, 2023 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding that a ban on conversion therapy is content-based because it prohibited certain speech based on the content of the speech used in that therapy). *Ill. Schl. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of Ill.*, 2023 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding that laws restricting doctors from assisting abortion providers who do not wish to perform abortions are content-based because they restrict doctors' communications).

Defendant's threats also prohibit speech based on the viewpoint it advances. "Threatening to prosecute someone who supports and fund laws that facilitate our, of, state abortions, Defendant targets speech that expresses the viewpoint that abortion care should be accessible. Like the restriction on conversion therapy in *Otto*, Defendant's threats seem to codify a particular viewpoint that abortion care should be inaccessible to pregnant Alabamians and wish abortion helpees like Plaintiff for advancing an



an indispensable means of these other individual liberties. Id. at 75.  
Restrictions on the right to associate can be sustained only if they satisfy strict scrutiny.









Defendant's threats involved Alabama's state constitutional provisions, Alabama Code § 5-A-1-1, of conduct to the protection of life, of, of, state conduct, that statute criminalizes a substantial number of constitutional acts prohibited in relation to the state's legislative branch. G. Bonta

; hich the 0stat7teP cannot be a%%lied constit7tionall&.G "e# \$or% tate Club Ass)n+ Inc.

v. City of "e# \$or%, .=< U.#. 5, 5. A5@=='. .

0f const37ed cont3a3& to 6hompson, see supra at 5.L5/, Alaba 2a (ode > 5+A, .,. ;o7ld e:tend to an& a83ee2ent to co2 2it an act that ;o7ld be c3i2inal in Alaba 2a, 3e8a3dless of ; hethe3 the a83eed,7%on act is a c3i2e in the state ; he3e it is co2 2itted. As a 3es7lt, the stat7te on its face c3i

that the statute would be within its scope is substantially violative and a direct result to enforce in law; first of all, of state conduct, could be considered; with an overt act, could be considered. Alabama could prohibit an association that fulfills the legal first of all, of state conduct, first because it disagrees; with the purpose of the association.

Courts have held that a statute is overbroad; hence, by its plain terms, it contains no limitation principle to narrow; the conduct that is prohibited. On Board of Airport Commissioners of City of Los Angeles, for example, the Supreme Court (first circuit) did; in a law; that banned all First Amendment activities in a specific part of Los Angeles International Airport. See U.S. at 101. The Court held that the words of the (o)-5.2360

Alabama (Code > 5+A, . . . ) reflects the same defects as the ordinance in FF Cosmetics and the anti-speech prohibition in Board of Airport Commissioners of City of Los Angeles. Even if Alabama has a compelling interest in prosecuting out-of-state unlawful activities, Alabama (Code > 5+A, . . . ) is unconstitutional as to the right of association and association about unlawful out-of-state activities, allowing Alabama to punish an individual, a parent, or association; which it disallows. "Because the constitutional guarantee of state has an impermissible chilling effect on protected speech, G id. at 5+- ), Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on its claim that Alabama (Code > 5+A, . . . ) is unconstitutional and overbroad.





he similarities between Edwards and this case are striking. Likewise, Edwards, Plaintiff is a helmsman to transmute the funds to travel to another state. See, e.g., Fountain Decl. KK ). Likewise, Plaintiff is facing potential criminal liability if it aids in another's travel. See, e.g., Fountain Decl. KK ).4 McLain Decl. KK ), ) . . And likewise, Edwards, Yellow Hammer Fund is being deprived of the fundamental right to move freely between states; while being faced with a state's efforts to isolate itself and its residents from other states in the Union. See Fountain Decl. KK 5, ).

Similarly, Crandall also establishes that Plaintiff is a citizen and that Defendant's threats violate the constitutional right to travel. On 5/1/19, Nevada enacted a law that levied a tax of one dollar upon an individual leaving the state by railroad, stagecoach, or other vehicle for hire.





Washington after completion of these five military districts in 1861, 1862, and 1863, and the rash of racial motivated terrorism inflicted on Athens and the time of the shooting. Id. see also *Winters v. United States*, 407 U.S. 124 (1972), 55 A/Th (13. 5@?<' Adesc3ibin8 facts of the 273de3 that ; e3e the basis of 'uest'.<sup>55</sup> After a local E73& failed to convict the suspects of 273de3, the federal government sought to prosecute the men for conspiring to deprive "lacB %eo%le of their constitutional rights, including the right to travel. 'uest, +=+ U.#. <.< n.5. Initially the district court dismissed the indictment

a deprivation of their constitutional rights at the hands of private actors.<sup>5)</sup> " If the case is rooted in the constitutional right to travel. *Id.* at </>. The #7%3e 2 e ( o73t stated that



Edwards and Crandall have held that Plaintiff can bring this claim on its own behalf. However, Plaintiff also has third-party standing to vindicate the right to travel on behalf of those it serves. Third-party standing is a prudential doctrine, not a constitutional principle, and the rule disfavors it. It is highly disfavored. (United States v. L.L.C. v. Russo, 555 U.S. 151, 155 (2008)). Accord id. at 151 n. 1 (Roberts, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has, for example, established third-party standing in cases where a litigant has Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of a law, policy, or action, and the interests of third parties . . . ; or would be unduly affected should constitutional challenge fail. (Carey v. Pop. Servs. Int'l, 505 U.S. 482, 485 (2002)). Accord Craig v. Boren, 401 U.S. 578, 584 (1971). Such cases have entailed a variety of fact patterns and interests. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 485 U.S. 371, 375 (1987) (holding that a civil defendant had third-party standing to assert the rights of potential jurors excluded for service).

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third, that standing to assert the equal protection rights of its tenants'. On fact, their interests are one and the same. Plaintiff's mission is to provide abortion funding and

been irrevocably lost. On contrast, Plaintiff is well positioned to assert claims on behalf of its clients. See *Southern Apartments, Inc., et al. v. F. & D. at 5-...* As a result of state actions, Plaintiff is the subject of Defendant's threatened prosecution and has suffered significant injury to its organizational mission such that it has strong incentives to pursue the claim on its clients' behalf. Id. As a result, Plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim because it is the party which the threatened

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
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