

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

*

*

*

CASE NO. 7:20-CV-62 (CDL)

WARDEN MICHAEL DONAHUE, *et al.*, *

Respondents. *

O R D E R

Petitioners are detainees at the Stewart Detention Center ("Stewart") and Irwin County Detention Center ("Irwin") either awaiting deportation from the United States pursuant to a final order of removal or awaiting resolution of their claim not to be removed. They seek emergency preliminary equitable relief temporarily releasing them from custody. They allege that

injunction now that Defendants have responded to it. *See Levine v. Comcoa Ltd.*, 70 F.3d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1995). The standard for the two is the same. To obtain such preliminary injunctive relief, Petitioners must establish the following: (1) that they have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits; (2) that they face an imminent and substantial threat of irreparable harm unless relief is granted; (3) that the threatened injury to them outweighs the harm the relief may cause defendants; and (4) the relief is not against the public interest. *Levi Strauss & Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice*, 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995).

Before the Court decides whether Petitioners have satisfied the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, it must determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide the matter. Petitioners maintain that because they seek a writ of habeas corpus releasing them from custody the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Alternatively, they argue that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine their implied cause of action for equitable relief to remedy constitutional

appropriate vehicle for . . . a claim challeng[ing] the conditions of confinement"). The circuits that have squarely addressed the issue are split on how they resolve it. See *Wilborn v. Mansukhani*, 795 F. App'x 157, 162-64 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (describing circuit split). The Court is persuaded that the Eleventh Circuit would likely follow the unpublished decision of its fellow colleagues who have decided the issue consistent with a majority of the other circuits. Accordingly, the Court finds that a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate mechanism for seeking the relief Petitioners request. And the Court may not exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court has considered Petitioners' argument that an exception should be made to the general principle that writs of habeas corpus cannot be used to remedy conditions of confinement claims when release from detention is the only meaningful remedy for the constitutional violation. The Court agrees that the general principle eschewing habeas relief as a means for remedying condition of confinement constitutional violations rests upon the assumption that eliminating the contested confinement conditions is possible without releasing the detainee from detention. And if the present record supported Petitioners' contention that they face substantial risk

for habeas relief persuasive. But based upon the present record, the Court does not find that the only way to remedy Petitioners' alleged constitutional violations is to release them from custody. Therefore, even if this narrow exception to the "no habeas for constitutional confinement claims" was recognized in *xces* B

preliminary equitable relief is release from detention, this claim does not support granting that relief.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioners' motion for emergency preliminary injunctive relief is denied. The Court emphasizes the narrow scope of today's ruling. Based upon the present record,